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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This matter involves three consolidated actions for 
damages against the State of Utah, Salt Lake County, and 
Gibbons & Reed Company based on flooding damage 
which occurred in two storms during a State highway con-
struction project. By order of the Court (R. 59) and pursu-
ant to Rule 42(b), the issue of liability was tried separately, 
reserving for later proceedings the question of damages. 
The Defendants State of Utah and Salt Lake County cross 
claimed against Gibbons & Reed Company. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A trial before a jury was held in the Court of the 
Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., Judge in the Third 
Judicial District Court on March 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 
13, 14, 15, and 18, 1974. A special verdict was returned 
by the jury upon interrogatories submitted to it. The jury 
found that the highway project of the State of Utah was 
unreasonably defective or dangerous and that the Plain-
tiffs were damaged as a proximate result. (R. 720-23) The 
jury also found that Salt Lake County unreasonably cre-
ated a defective or dangerous condition in the utilization 
of its storm drain system and that all Plaintiffs (except 
Richard Grotepas who had not sued the County) were 
damaged as a proximate result. (R. 723-24) In addition, 
the jury found that Salt Lake County was negligent in 
failing to provide reasonably adequate drainage facilities 
for the highway project and that Plaintiffs suffered 
damage as a proximate result thereof. (R. 728) Finally, 
the jury found that Gibbons & Reed Company was negli-
gent in failing to take reasonable precautions to protect 
2 
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the project during construction and that this negligence 
proximately caused damage to Plaintiffs. (R. 728) 
An amended Order and Judgment was entered on 
May 15, 1974, under which the Court found that the 
State of Utah is liable for damages to all Plaintiffs as a 
result of the flood which occurred on August 17, 1969. 
(R. 776-77) The State was also adjudged liable for 
damages incurred by Plaintiffs Kunkel for flooding on 
April 3, 1969. (R. 777-78) However, contrary to the find-
ings of the jury, the Court ruled that the County of Salt 
Lake and Gibbons & Reed Company were not liable for 
any damages suffered by any Plaintiffs. (R. 778) The 
Court also ruled that Gibbons & Reed Company was not 
liable for any damages under the cross claims of the State 
of Utah and Salt Lake County, and awarded costs in favor 
of Plaintiffs and against the State of Utah and in favor 
of Gibbons & Reed Company against Plaintiffs. (R. 778) 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiffs-Appellants seek an order from this 
Court directing the trial court to modify its judg-
ment in accord with the jury's verdict holding Salt Lake 
County and Gibbons & Reed Company liable jointly and 
severally with the State of Utah for the damages incurred 
by the Plaintiffs. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiffs in this action are all homeowners re-
siding in an area immediately west of Wasatch Boule-
vard near 4500 South in Salt Lake County. (Ex. 6P) This 
3 
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general area is located on the base slopes of Mt, Olympus 
which rises sharply from the valley floor as part of the 
Wasatch Front. (Ex. IP) The Defendant Gibbons & Reed 
Company is a large Utah construction company. (R. 1775-
1777) 
The Highway Construction Project 
In 1968, Gibbons & Reed Company was awarded a 
contract by the State of Utah to construct a segment of an 
interstate highway running north and south from Inter-
state 80 to approximately 4700 South following the route 
of old Wasatch Boulevard along the base slopes of the 
Wasatch Front. (R. 1776, Ex. 6P) The portion of this 
project relevant to this proceeding commences at 3900 
South and runs on a downgrade to 4600 South and then 
rises sharply to join the old Wasatch Boulevard in a tem-
porary terminus at approximately 4700 South. Virtually 
the entire portion of this section of the highway lies below 
the natural surface of the surrounding terrain. Thus, the 
highway was situated in an excavated "cut" which inter-
cepted the natural drainage channels flowing down the 
mountainside from east to west. (R. 909, Ex. IP) The 
point at which the downgrade ended at 4600 South and 
the rise to the temporary terminus commenced is describ-
ed as a "grade sag" (R. 1104) and in fact formed a basin 
with only a small embankment on the west side protecting 
homes below and to the west of the project. (R. 1107-09) 
In the construction process, Gibbons & Reed Com-
pany followed the State's plans but was unrestricted in 
two important areas: (1) It was given discretionary re-
sponsibility to protect the project during construction, and 
4 
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(2) it was able to use its discretion in determining what 
sequence to accomplish the various steps of the project. 
(See R. 1786, 1787) 
As of April 3, 1969 (the date of the first flood), the 
cut had been made across the slope. The storm drain sys-
tem for the highway had not been completed. As of Aug-
ust 17, 1969 (the date of the second flood), the concrete 
road beds had been laid. (R. 1475-77) The cut banks had 
been denuded. (See Exs. 6P, 32P, 33P, 30P, 105D, 95D, 
104D, 68P, 67P, 107D) No grass, sod or other materials 
had been placed permanently or temporarily to prevent 
erosion (Id.). The highway storm drain system had been 
connected to the County system, but no effort had been 
made to insure that either system was free of obstruction. 
(R. 1555, 1725, 1726, 1293) No permanent or temporary 
storm grates had been placed over the entrances to the 
storm drain system laterals to prevent debris from washing 
into the storm system. (R. 1298, 1557, I860) Protective 
curbing and diking had been removed. (R. 1760, 1520A, 
1354) 
The Storm Drain System 
Salt Lake County retained the engineering firm of 
Caldwell, Richards & Sorenson to prepare a Master Storm 
Drain Study for the County in 1964. (Ex. 73P) That study 
showed that the interstate highway involved in this litiga-
tion was contemplated. The Master Study, however, did 
not anticipate the temporary terminus or end of the free-
way at 4700 South. Instead, the drawings in the Study 
showed that the highway was to continue southward for 
over a mile. (See 73P at fig. 23) 
5 
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In addition, the Study specifically observed that the 
area in question was highly dangerous in terms of flood-
ing potential. Concerning this subject, the Study contained 
the following observations (Ex. 73P): 
Listed briefly, some of the causes of flooding, and 
damage from flooding, throughout Salt Lake 
County are the following: 
•»• *& H» 
In the Foothills and Mountainside Slopes: 
(a) Flash floods on steep gullies and ravines. 
(b) Unwise filling of natural drainage 
courses, and failure to provide culverts or under-
ground drainage systems. 
• # # 
Much flood damage could be prevented and drain-
age problems simplified, with proper planning 
and perhaps some legal restrictions. (Pages 1, 2) 
Once disturbed in grading, trenching or other 
types of movement this area {the mountain slopes 
and foothills} becomes highly vulnerable to wash-
ing and displacement when water applied to the 
surface becomes greater than can be readily ab-
sorbed. (Page 11) 
Rain may come in low volume steady fall over a 
period of many hours or it may come as a high 
intensity, short duration storm dropping a very 
heavy flow over a concentrated area or over a 
relatively large area. When this occurs so that 
rapid runoff from steeper slopes combines with 
that falling or running off the flatter slopes, there 
is created the problem of providing for the safe, 
orderly removal of this water from the area of 
origination to the final point of disposition. (Page 
14) 
6 
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Despite the relatively great cost of storm drain-
age, its provision to the maximum possible extent 
is, in every modern community, becoming regard-
ed as a fundamental necessity. (Page 44) 
A program of cleaning and repairing of these exist-
ing facilities wiUbe necessary, as it was found dur-
ing the field investigations that many catch basins 
and pipes are completely filled up. At the very 
least, this has caused nuisance to the public in the 
past. (Page 66) 
[T)he engineering of storm drainage for hillside 
areas requires special considerations. A great deal 
more control of runoff waters is necessary because 
of the increased velocities created by building 
houses and streets on slopes where previously vege-
tation helped to absorb and lessen the runoff from 
a rain storm. Salt Lake County has allowed some 
hillside development without adequate provision 
for storm drainage. Subdividers have been per-
mitted to fill in natural drainage courses and con-
struct homes on the fill, without installing cul-
verts or storm drain systems. In the area near 4500 
South and Wasatch Boulevard, much damage has 
taken place during the following rainstorms, due 
to lack of adequate drainage facilities . . . The con-
struction of Proposed Storm Drain "GG" is in-
tended to relieve this situation. Construction of the 
Belt Route within the next 5 years will result in 
the relocation of Wasatch Boulevard to the east of 
its present location between Oakcliff Drive and 
Bernada Drive. Early construction of this por-
tion of System "GG", in cooperation with the Utah 
Highway Department should have high priority. 
(Pages 78-79) 
7 
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The evidence presented at the trial (and discussed 
more fully below) indicated the following matters: 
(1) Storm Drain "GG" was never constructed. (R. 
1156,1197) 
(2) Wasatch Boulevard was relocated and the 
effective use of the Boulevard as a drainage channel was 
eliminated because the high curb on the west side of the 
street was removed, allowing runoff water to flow across 
the Boulevard and down onto the freeway. (R. 1354, 
1520A, 1540, 1543-44, 1558, 1760, 1762, 1763) 
(3) The Storm Drains provided to drain the area 
were not adequate in size to carry the anticipated runoff 
from even a storm of anticipated volume and intensity. 
(R. 1669, 1681, 1201) 
(4) N o maintenance program was established by the 
County regarding the drains in question. As far as the 
County was aware, they had never been cleaned prior to 
the flooding in this case. (R. 1293, 1726) 
(5) The connection between the Highway drain and 
the County drain did not conform to sound engineering 
principles because a large pipe was drained into a smaller 
pipe. (R. 1759, 1712) 
(6) N o permanent or temporary screens or grates 
were required or installed to protect lateral intakes. (R. 
1860,1292,1298) 
(7) At the time of the flood in the present case, the 
Storm Drain System was inadequate. (R. 1156) 
8 
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The Storms 
On April 3, 1969, a heavy rain storm resulted in run-
off water washing down earth and debris from the con-
struction site into the yard of Plaintiffs Kunkel. (R. 1029, 
Ex. 53P, R. 1048) Mr. and Mrs. Kunkel brought this mat-
ter to the attention of all Defendants through personal 
conversations and also through correspondence. (R. 1031, 
1032, 1034, 1035, 1044) 
On Sunday, August 17, 1969, at approximately 6:00 
p.m., a heavy rainstorm occurred in the vicinity of 4500 
South and Wasatch Boulevard. The amount of rain which 
fell in a period of about 45 minutes approximately 2.5 
inches. (R. 1260, 1334, 1307-08) The jury found that the 
storm was not an "Act of God." (Finding G, R. 728) 
The testimony revealed that storms of high intensity 
occur along the Wasatch Front and that the month of 
August is the month in which such storms most frequently 
occur. (R. 1265, 1305, 1603, 1614) 
As the rain fell, runoff water from the residential 
area above Wasatch Boulevard flowed down from the 
Olympus Cove area to the relocated Boulevard. (R. 1762) 
In prior storms, such runoff water was channeled south 
by the Boulevard to the "Shadow Mountain Area" which 
is located nearly one mile south of the Plaintiffs' homes. 
(R. 1558) None of the Plaintiffs had ever encountered 
flooding damage prior to the construction here involved. 
(R. 826, 835, 846, 855, 860, 880, 954, 980, 1018, 1024, 
1058, 1063, 1068, 1078, 1432) 
9 
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Because the Boulevard no longer had a high curb or 
dike on the west edge, the flood waters were allowed to 
cascade over the Boulevard and to flow onto the new 
freeway below. As they did so, substantial quantities of 
earth from the denuded cut banks were eroded. (See Exs. 
95D, 101D, 104D, 105D, 67P, 68P) At the time of the 
floods, the concrete highway road beds were in place but 
the cut ditches and barrow pits were unlined and un-
protected. (R. 1488, 1475-77) The concrete road beds, 
constructed by defendants State of Utah and Gibbons & 
Reed, intercepted the flood waters which otherwise would 
have flowed west and downhill, substantially north of the 
Plaintiffs' homes. (R. 1558, Ex. 8P) The intercepted flood 
waters were channeled south and downhill in the highway 
cut to the low point of the grade sag. At that point, a large 
backup of water and debris was created. (Ex. 8P) Storm 
drains were inadequate to carry off the water. They had 
become completely filled with debris—some rocks 14 
inches in diameter. (See Ex. 84P) The flood waters soon 
broke through the embankment on the west side of the 
freeway. A great torrent of water then rushed out of the 
grade sag reservoir and flooded the homes of the Plain-
tiffs. (Ex. 8P) The County storm sewer, which had be-
come completely obstructed, also emitted water from two 
manholes which erupted in geyser-like fashion, also flood-
ing the Plaintiffs' homes. (R. 806, 845) 
The Damage 
The evidence showed and the jury found that all 34 
homes of the Plaintiffs sustained damages as a result of 
the flooding. (Finding A(2), R. 721-23) Counsel for the 
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State and County advised the trial court that the total 
damages exceeded $100,000.00. 
The issue of the exact amount of damages was re-
served for a later hearing. > 
The Defendants' Involvement 
The State. The jury found that "with respect to the 
flood condition on August 17, 1969, the highway project 
of the State of Utah, including the storm drain system, was 
unreasonably defective or dangerous/' and that all of the 
Plaintiffs had damage to their property as a proximate 
result of the State's project. (Finding A(l) and (2), R. 721) 
With respect to the flooding of the property of Mr. and 
Mrs. Kunkel on April 3, 1969, the jury found that "the 
improvements and highway project created by the State 
of Utah was unreasonably defective or dangerous." (Find-
ing D( l ) and (2), R. 727) 
On the basis of the jury's findings, the trial court 
entered judgment against the State of Utah. 
The County. The jury found that with respect to the 
flooding condition of August 17, 1969, ''Salt Lake County 
unreasonably created a defective or dangerous condition 
in the utilization of its storm drain system and that this 
caused damage to all Plaintiffs." (Finding B(l) and (2), 
R. 723) The jury also found that Salt Lake County was 
negligent in failing to provide reasonably adequate drain-
age facilities for the highway project and that the Plain-
tiffs were damaged as a proximate result of said negli-
gence. (Finding I, R. 728) With respect to Plaintiffs 
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Kunkel on April 3, 1969, the jury found that "Salt Lake 
County created an unreasonably defective or dangerous 
condition in the utilization of the storm sewer system/' 
causing damage to the Kunkels. (Finding E(l) and (2), 
R.727) 
The trial court declined to enter judgment against 
the County. 
Gibbons & Reed Company. The jury found that 
"Gibbons & Reed Company was negligent in that it failed 
to take reasonable precautions to protect the project dur-
ing construction.'' This negligence proximately caused 
damage to Plaintiffs. (Findings J(l) and K, R. 728). 
The trial court also declined to enter judgment against 
Gibbons & Reed Company. 
Limitation on Liability 
Under the Governmental Immunity Act, every policy 
of insurance purchased by a governmental entity must 
provide property damage coverage to a limit of not less 
than $50,000.00 in any one accident. (U.C.A. 63-30-29) 
Any judgment over the insurance coverage minimum 
amounts for property damage liability must be reduced by 
the court to a sum equal to the minimum requirements or 
the actual insurance coverage. (U.C.A. 63-30-34) 
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A R G U M E N T 
Summary of Plaintiffs9 Position 
The Plaintiffs contend that the Trial Court erred 
when it failed to enter judgment on the jury's verdict with 
respect to Salt Lake County and Gibbons & Reed; that the 
record strongly supports the jury's verdict both with re-
spect to Salt Lake County and Gibbons & Reed; that the 
damages incurred by Plaintiffs constitute an inverse con-
demnation by the State of Utah and County of Salt Lake 
for the entire amount of which the State and County are 
liable. 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ENTERING 
JUDGMENT INCONSISTENT W I T H THE 
JURY'S FINDINGS. 
The jury found that concerning the August 17, 1969, 
flooding, Salt Lake County unreasonably created a defec-
tive or dangerous condition in the utilization of its storm 
drain system "and that this proximately caused damage to 
all Plaintiffs." (Finding B(l) and (2), R.723) With respect 
to the Plaintiffs Kunkel on April 3, 1969, the jury further 
found "Salt Lake County created an unreasonably defective 
or dangerous condition in the utilization of the storm 
sewer system" and that this proximately damaged the 
Kunkels. (Finding E(l) and (2), R. 727) The jury also 
found that Salt Lake County was negligent in failing to 
provide reasonably adequate drainage facilities for the 
project. (Finding I, R. 728) The jury also found that Gib-
bons & Reed Company was negligent "in failing to take 
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reasonable precautions to protect the project during con-
struction" and that such negligence proximately caused 
damage to Plaintiffs. (Finding J ( l ) and K, R. 728) 
Despite these specific and clear findings, the Trial 
Court refused to enter judgment against Salt Lake County 
and Gibbons & Reed Company. This inconsistency be-
tween the jury's findings and the judgment constitutes 
error. 
Rule 39 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure deals 
with "Trial by Jury or by the Court." Subsection (a) 
deals with trial "By Jury," and states as follows: 
When trial by jury has been demanded as provid-
ed in Rule 38, the action shall be designated upon 
the register of actions as a jury action. The trial 
of all issues so demanded shall he hy jury, unless 
* * * [exceptions not herein applicable.} [Em-
phasis added.} 
The latitude which the trial court has regarding the 
judgment to be entered in a case where special verdicts 
have been utilized under U.R.C.P. Rule 49 has been de-
fined by the Utah Supreme Court as follows: 
It is recognized that where a case is submitted to 
the jury on special verdicts, the trial court may 
make corrections of obvious errors or defects 
therein, and he may make additional findings on 
issues which have not been submitted to the jury, 
but are necessary to settle the issues involved. But 
when a party has demanded a trial by jury he is 
entitled to have the jury find the facts, and it is 
not the trial court's prerogative to make findings 
inconsistent therewith and thereby defeat the effect 
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of the jury's findings. First Security Bank of Utah, 
N.A. v. Ezra C. Lundahl, Inc., 22 Utah 2d 433, 454 
P.2d 886, 889 (1969). [Emphasis added.} 
In that case, the trial judge made an additional finding 
which in effect nullified a finding made by the jury. The 
judge's additional finding was not allowed by the Utah 
Supreme Court to defeat the finding of the jury. 
The relationship between findings and the judgment 
rendered thereon has been further stated as follows by the 
Utah Supreme Court: 
In Evans v. Shand, 74 Utah 451, 280 P. 239, this 
Court held that a valid judgment must not only 
rest upon pleadings but upon findings. It is funda-
mental that findings of fact and conclusions of law 
must proceed entry of judgment. Fisher v. Emer-
son, 15 Utah 517, 50 P. 619; Billings v. Parsons, 
17 Utah 22, 53 P. 730. "It is fundamental that the 
conclusions of law must be predicated upon and 
find their support in the findings of fact, and the 
judgment must follow the conclusions of law" and 
if the conclusions are at variance with the findings, 
the Supreme Court will order the loiver court to 
set aside its erroneous conclusions and substitute 
the correct ones therefor. This is the law as an-
nounced in Parrot Bros. Company v. Ogden City, 
50 Utah 512, 167 P. 807. And, again, we find in 
Brittain v. Gorman, 42 Utah 586, 133 P. 370, that 
conclusions of law must be based upon facts and 
must be considered with the facts, and in like fash-
ion, the Court's decree must rest upon legal con-
clusions and be consistent with them. A judgment, 
if in conformity with the findings, will not be 
disturbed. And, of course, the converse is true. A 
judgment not in conformity with the findings can-
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not be permitted to stand. Mason v. Mason, 160 
P.2d 730, 732, 108 Utah 428 (1945). [Emphasis 
added.} 
Any confusion arising among interrogatories to a 
jury and answers thereto should be resolved in accordance 
with the following standard: 
Whenever there is uncertainty or doubt in 
connection with the correlation of interrogatories 
with each other and their answers, they should be 
so interpreted as to harmonize with the findings of 
the jury if that can reasonably be done. Pace v. Par-
rish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273, 275 (1952). 
Here again, it is the intention of the jury which is con-
trolling, not that of the judge. 
The circumstances under which the court can amend 
or correct a verdict are set forth in the following language 
from 53 Am. Jur. Trials §1094, to which a footnote cita-
tion was made by the Utah Supreme Court in the quota-
tion from the Lundahl case, supra. 
A verdict in a civil case which is defective or 
erroneous as to a mere matter of form not affecting 
the merits or rights of the parties may be amend-
ed by the court to conform it to the issues and to 
give effect to what the jury unmistakably found. 
In fact, it is the duty of the judge to look after its 
form and substance, so as to prevent a doubtful or 
insufficient finding from passing into the records 
of the court; and every reasonable construction 
should be adopted for the purpose of working the 
verdict into form so as to make it serve. 
Thus, where the trial judge misinterprets or 
fails to record the verdict the jury obviously in-
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tended to render, it has been held to be within the 
power of the trial court to mold or amend the re-
corded verdict of the jury so as to make a verdict 
which in form inaccurately expresses the jury's in-
tention conform exactly to what the jury intended 
to find, where the intention is obvious from the 
record; and in the event of the failure of the trial 
court so to mold the verdict the appellate court will 
do so. 
While the practice of amending verdicts in 
matters of form is one of long standing, based on 
principles of the soundest public policy in the fur-
therance of justice, it is strictly limited to cases 
where the jury have expressed their meaning in an 
informal manner. The court has no power to sup-
ply substantial omissions, and the amendment in 
all cases must he such as to make the verdict con-
form to the real intent of the jury. The judge can-
not, under the guise of amending the verdict, in-
vade the province of the jury or substitute his ver-
dict for theirs. After the amendment the verdict 
must he not what the judge thinks it ought to have 
been, but what the jury intended it to be. Their 
actual intent, and not his notion of what they ought 
to have intended, is the thing to be expressed and 
worked out by the amendment. 53 Am. Jur. Trials 
§1094 with 1973 pocket part addition inserted. 
[Emphasis added.} 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do provide a 
means whereby the verdict of a jury may be disregarded 
and a judgment inconsistent therewith may be entered. 
U.R.C.P. Rule 50(b), "Motion for Judgment Notwith-
standing the Verdict" is intended, 
* * * to permit the trial judge to submit the case 
to the jury for their determination, then if the ver-
dict goes adverse to the moving party, he can, when 
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there is more time for deliberation, re-examine and 
rule upon whether a jury question exists. Roche v. 
Zee, 1 Utah 2d 193, 264 P.2d 855, 856 (1953). 
However, a motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict is not to be inferred, presumed, or judicially 
initiated, but must be specifically and timely made. 
To apply for the arrest of a judgment on an ad-
verse verdict, the motion must be definite and spe-
cific. In exercising authority under a statute or rule 
of court to render a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, the power of the court must be properly 
invoked by the procedure therein provided, and 
the judgment may be rendered only after a full 
compliance with the provisions of the statute or 
rule. 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments §119. 
No such motion having been made by Defendants Salt 
Lake County or Gibbons & Reed Company, the District 
Court had no authority to enter judgment contrary to the 
jury verdict. Neither has there been, nor could there be, 
a finding of an "absence of any substantial evidence to 
support the verdict" (Koer v. Mayfair Markets, 19 Utah 
2d 339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967)), as would be required in 
order to enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
even if such were otherwise proper. 
The rule is firmly established that a jury verdict is 
not to be upset if believable facts are adduced supporting 
it. See, e.g., Estate of Hubbard, 30 Utah 2d 260, 516 P.2d 
741 (1973). Other cases have reached the same result. See 
Taylor v. Weber County, 4 Utah 2d 328, 293 P.2d 925 
(1956), where it was held that when evidence amply sus-
tains a verdict, the courts should not overturn it. 
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Similarly, in Porter v. Price, 11 Utah 2d 80, 355 P.2d 
66 (I960), it was held that the verdict of a jury must not 
be set aside unless a reasonable man could not come to 
the same conclusion even when all evidence and inferences 
fairly derived therefrom are taken in the light most favor-
able to the prevailing party. 
In Winchester v, Egan Farm Service, 4 Utah 2d 129, 
288 P.2d 790 (1955), the Court reached a similar result, 
stating that in the absence of a showing that a jury's 
finding was not supported by evidence, the court should 
not disturb the jury's finding. No such showing has been 
made here. Indeed, as shown below, the jury's verdict 
is amply supported. 
In other recent cases, the Utah Supreme Court has 
ruled that judges should be reluctant to interfere with 
jury verdicts and should not do so as long as there is any 
reasonable basis in evidence to justify such verdicts. 
Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364, 412 P.2d 451 (1966). 
Accord, Gordon v. Provo City, 15 Utah 2d 287, 391 P.2d 
430 (1964); Banks v. Shivers, 20 Utah 2d 25, 432 P.2d 
339(1967). 
In the present case, the trial court judge allowed the 
case to go to the jury which then rendered a verdict con-
sistent with the evidence and finding all Defendants liable. 
But the trial court improperly departed from the jury 
verdict and entered a judgment which is opposite in result 
to the jury's findings relative to the liability of Salt Lake 
County and Gibbons & Reed Company. Such a course of 
judicial action is contrary to both the spirit and the letter 
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of the jury trial system, is contrary to established rules of 
law and procedure, and should not be permitted to stand. 
The judgment should be modified to conform to the ver-
dict. 
POINT II. 
THE FACTS SUPPORT THE JURY'S FIND-
INGS CONCERNING SALT LAKE COUNTY 
AND GIBBONS & REED. 
A. THE RECORD AMPLY SUPPORTS THE JURY'S 
FINDINGS AND THEREFORE THE COUNTY 
SHOULD ALSO BE HELD LIABLE. 
Plaintiffs proved their case against the County under 
both the majority and dissenting opinions of Sanford v. 
University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971). 
In that case a landowner was flooded during a State-spon-
sored construction project following a heavy rain storm. 
The jury held the defendants liable under the applicable 
statutes. The elements to be shown in this type of case as 
required by the majority opinion in Sanford are (1) change 
in the natural drainage flow; (2) creation of a drainage 
system; (3) creation of a defective or dangerous condi-
tion; (4) knowledge of the danger; and (5) damage to 
Plaintiffs. The dissent added the additional requirement 
of a negligence showing. In this case the Plaintiffs estab-
lished each of these elements as is more fully discussed 
below. 
1. Change in the Natural Drainage Flow. 
Exhibit IP offered by Plaintiffs is an aerial photo-
graph depicting the area in question and illustrating the 
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natural drainage flows. The testimony of Professor Harry 
Goode showed that the new highway intercepted the natural 
drainage flows and gathered runoff water "in the same 
way that a ditch would." (R. 909; see also Ex. 8-P) 
By directing the runoff waters into storm drain Line 
C of the County system, the County engineer admitted 
that the natural drainage flow had ben changed. (R. 1711) 
Also, the County permitted the State to connect the high-
way drainage system into the County system, thereby 
becoming a party to the directing of runoff waters into 
unnatural courses. (R. 1467) In addition, the County per-
mitted the removal of the protective "dike" (R. 1763) or 
high curbing along the western edge of old Wasatch 
Boulevard which had formerly channeled runoff waters 
south and away from the Plaintiffs. (R. 1520A, 1354, 
1540, 1543-44, 1558, 1762). The lack of the Boulevard 
dike is evident in Exhibits 30P, 32P, 33P, 102D, and 82P. 
Each of the Plaintiffs testified that storm waters had 
never caused damage to them prior to this project (see 
R. 826, 835, 846, 855, 860, 880, 954, 980, 1018, 1024, 
1058, 1063, 1068, 1078, 1432). 
2. Creation of a Drainage System. 
There was no dispute that the County had created a 
drainage system. Exhibit 73P (the Master Study) clearly 
showed the County's plan and intent to create a system 
for the area in question. The County participated in the 
highway project by permitting the State to connect the 
highway system directly into the County system which was 
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extended through Line C of storm drain JJ to accommo-
date the portion of the highway containing the grade sag 
(see also R. 1467, Ex. 7P). 
At the preconstruction conference held on May 29, 
1968, the County was represented by the following in-
dividuals (see Ex. 7P): 
William J. Wilson County Highway Department 
J. Rex MacKay Director, County Flood Control 
Marvin Melville County Water System, Inc. 
Lamont B. Gundersen Director, County Highway Dept. 
Earl Skillicorn County Road System 
A. H. Sorensen, Jr. Engineer 
These individuals participated in the joint planning of 
the project particularly as it affected the interconnection 
of the State project with the County facilities. 
3. Creation of a Defective or Dangerous Condition. 
At the time of the flood on August 17, 1969, storm 
waters exceeding the capacity of the clogged County storm 
drain Line C erupted from two manholes along the line, 
spewing water about ten feet high. (R. 806) The man-
holes erupted because of the obstruction in the County 
line. (R. 806) After the flood, Line C was found to be 
two-thirds full of silt and debris (R. 1282) for a length 
of about 700-800 feet. (R. 1288) 
Prior to the flood and following the completion of 
the connection to the County Line C, absolutely no effect 
was made by the County or any other party to determine 
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whether Line C was free from obstructions. (R. 1293, 
1555, 1557, 1725-26) This was the case even though the 
County was aware that any debris in the line would re-
duce its capacity. (R. 1661, 1517, Ex. 73P at page 66) In 
fact, Line C had never been maintained at all prior to 
the flood. (R. 1694, 1725-26) County officials charged 
with flood control responsibilities even denied that there 
was a County storm drain in the area immediately after 
the flooding occurred. (R. 1293) 
No effort was made by the County to insist that the 
highway drain system be protected by grates or other de-
vices to prevent materials and debris from entering Line C 
(R. 1298) As a result, all lateral intakes existing on the 
project were open and unprotected (R. 1298) allowing 
rocks and debris to enter the County's system. Expert wit-
ness Professor Cecil Jacobsen testified that it was not 
good engineering practice to have such unprotected lead 
drains, particularly during the vulnerable construction 
phase of the project. (R. 1849-53) County witness Nielsen 
testified that Line C was not designed to carry any sub-
stance other than water. (R. 1708). Thus, it was little 
wonder that the system did not function properly. 
In addition, the portion of Line C which was clogged 
was constructed with less than a one percent slope for 660 
feet. (R. 1707) Larger materials will settle out easier in 
such areas. (R. 1659) With less than one foot drop in one 
hundred horizontal feet, it is not surprising to find that 
14-inch diameter rocks would not be flushed through 
Line C. The County witness testified that a 14-inch rock 
would materially reduce the capacity of the Line. (R. 
1708) 
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The County further permitted the State to connect a 
42-inch line into the smaller 36-inch Line C. (R. 1712) 
This connection occurred at the point the State highway 
system connected to the troublesome Line C. Good engi-
neering practice dictates that 
pipe sizes should not decrease in the downstream 
direction even though increased slope may provide 
adequate capacity in the smaller pipe. Any debris 
which enters a drain must be carried through the 
system to the outlets, and the possibility of clogging 
a smaller pipe with debris which may pass a larger 
pipe is too great. (R. 1758-59) 
Nevertheless, the County ignored this principle and per-
mitted the State to connect the larger pipe into the smaller 
downstream pipe. The principle was shown to be accurate 
on August 17, 1969. Ten days were required for the 
County employees to clean the debris from the smaller 
pipe, Line C. (R. 1288) 
In addition to the foregoing, the dangerous and de-
fective character of the storm drain system was further 
illustrated in the testimony of County witness Sorensen. 
He testified that approximately 97.75 cubic feet per sec-
ond of storm water was drained into Line C which was 
designed to carry only 87 cubic feet per second, assuming 
free-running water. (R. 1669) Moreover, Mr. Sorensen 
agreed that in addition to the 97.75 cfs, other areas drained 
into Line C which were not included in the total. (R. 1681) 
Thus, even greater quantities of water would be present 
to further overload the system. Professor Jacobsen testi-
fied (at R. 1156): 
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The Court: The question was the planning 
of the drainage system reasonably, meet reasonable 
standards to meet the runoff to be expected, was 
the sewer system capable of handling the reason-
ably anticipated runoff? 
The Witness (Jacobsen): In my opinion, no 
very definitely because the engineers also planned 
another conduit or drain leading to the south to 
intercept part of this very area. So that an addi-
tional load was placed upon the system as construct-
ed, which made it inadequate to carry this amount 
of runoff. 
Q. (By Mr. Boyden): Now that additional 
sewer which was not constructed, referred to in 
the flood control report? 
A. Right. 
In addition to the inadequate capacity of Line C, 
the witnesses testified that the rainfall intensity chart 
which was used to determine the anticipated runoff in the 
area in question was insufficient and inapplicable. More 
rain falls on the mountain slopes than on the Salt Lake 
airport. (R. 1257, 1303, 1654-55) Nevertheless, the chart 
that was used to determine runoff was based upon air-
port and downtown Salt Lake weather statistics. (R. 1257), 
1709-11) It is not sound engineering practice for the 
County to have used an inapplicable chart. (R. 1710) 
Finally, the County permitted the removal of the 
protective dike and curbing along Wasatch Boulevard 
without providing for adequate drainage. This facilitated 
the erosion and washout of cut banks and the subsequent 
clogging of the County system. 
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Thus, the evidence was overwhelming that the 
County participated in the creation of a dangerous and 
defective condition in the following ways: (1) it failed 
totally to maintain its storm drain system; (2) it failed to 
determine whether Line C when connected was free from 
obstructions; (3) it failed to require that lead intakes were 
protected from accepting debris and rocks particularly 
during the construction period; (4) it permitted rocks 
and debris to enter the system which was not designed to 
handle such materials; (5) when the County agreed to 
the connection with its line, it knew it had constructed 
Line C with a very flat grade which made it susceptible 
to clogging; (6) it permitted the State to connect a larger 
drain pipe upstream to a smaller pipe also contributing 
to clogging; (7) it permitted the State to drain runoff 
water into a system which was already inadequate to 
handle anticipated runoff; (8) it relied upon unsound data 
in determining its requirements for runoff capacity; and 
(9) it permitted the removal of protective diking and 
curbing which would have directed the flood waters away 
from Plaintiffs. 
The foregoing nine items furnish more than a suffi-
cient basis for the jury's findings that "Salt Lake County 
unreasonably created a defective or dangerous condition 
in the utilization of its storm drain system" (Finding B(l ) , 
R. 723) and as required by the dissenting opinion in San-
ford v. University of Utah, supra, "Salt Lake County was 
negligent in failing to provide reasonable, adequate drain-
age facilities for the highway project/' (Finding I, (R. 
728) Consequently, the trial court judge should have 
entered judgment against Salt Lake County. 
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4. Salt Lake County Was Fully Aware of the Danger 
Possible In This Case. 
When the preconstruction conference was held on 
May 29, 1968, the following relevant portion of the min-
utes reflects that the County was aware of the problems 
involved in this case (Ex. 7P, page five): 
VI. County Planning. 
* * * 
Mackay [Director, Salt Lake County Flood Control}: 
If we can start one and get going — we have 
engineering done. We need to tie into 36-inch line 
on Wasatch Blvd. which subsequently ties into 
our storm sewer. We have three problems: (1) 
sudden showers; (2) flood; (3) the public on our 
necks. I don't have contractor's schedule. I would 
suggest we sit down with the contractor and 
schedule it out. Upper residential section run-off 
will create problems. 
See also R. 1751. 
Other items of evidence also revealed the County's 
awareness of these problems. For example, as set forth 
in the Statement of Facts, supra, the County's Master 
Storm Drain Study (Ex. 73P) also indicated such aware-
ness. See pages 1-2 (referring to "flash floods" on moun-
tain slopes), page 11 (referring to erosion of excavated 
earth), page 14 (referring to runoff on steep slopes), and 
page 66 (referring to the need of good maintenance pro-
grams and the existence of clogged drains and pipes). 
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Most explicit is the section at pages 78-79 referring to 
specific flood damage in the area near the Plaintiffs at 
4500 South and Wasatch Boulevard. 
Another example of County awareness is found in 
Exhibit 12IP which was an article appearing in the Salt 
Lake Tribune on July 31, 1965, describing flash floods 
along the Wasatch Front and specifically stating: 
Wasatch Boulevard in an area near 4400 
South was covered with so much mud, rock and 
debris that it was closed for several hours while 
crews plowed it open. 
Plaintiffs Kunkel also appraised the County of flood-
ing problems in this area when they wrote several letters 
preceding the August 17, 1969, flooding. (See Exs. 53P, 
54P, and 6IP) County Commissioner Royal K. Hunt re-
plied to Mrs. Kunkel on June 2, 1969: 
. . . I have requested the Recreation Depart-
ment to cooperate with and instruct the WBBA 
and the Flood Control Department to provide 
whatever protection is feasible for your property 
to prevent flooding. 
Obviously "whatever protection is feasible" was not pro-
vided by the County which failed to maintain its system 
and permitted the removal of protective dikes and curb-
ing in addition to all of the other shortcomings noted 
above. 
The County should also have been aware that August 
is the prime month for cloudburst floods along the Wasatch 
Front (R. 1303-05, 1265, 1603, 1614) 
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Thus, County awareness of the potential danger in 
this case was clearly established by the evidence. 
5. The Plaintiffs Were Injured As a Result of The 
Dangerous and Defective Condition Created by 
The County. 
In both of its findings concerning Salt Lake County, 
the jury expressly found that the Plaintiffs were proxi-
mately damaged as a result of County action. (Findings 
B2, 12, R. 723, 728) The evidence supported these find-
ings. Plaintiffs testified concerning each and every home 
which was damaged. The path of the flood waters was 
traced on Exhibit 6 by the witnesses showing each home 
which was damaged. Numerous photographs of homes 
damaged by the f loodwaters and showing the path of the 
floodwaters were also received in evidence, (see, e.g., 
108D, 50P, 51P, 52P, 19P, 21P, 48P, 49P, 26P, 27P, 46P, 
12P, 13P, 14P, 15P, 25P, 24P, 20P, 22P, I I P , and 18P) 
All of the Sanford Requirements Were Fulfilled. 
As the foregoing has demonstrated, the requirements 
set down in the Sanford decision were met. Thus, when the 
trial court refused to enter judgment against the County 
in accord with the jury's findings which were supported 
by competent evidence, he committed error. This court 
can correct that error by directing the trial court to enter 
judgment against the County in favor of the Plaintiffs.* 
* Plaintiff Richard Grotepas did not name the County as a Defendant 
and is thus not entitled to be included in said judgment. 
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The Trial Court Denied Defendants9 Motion for a 
Directed Verdict. 
At the close of all evidence, Defendants Salt Lake 
and the State of Utah each moved for a directed verdict. 
The trial court denied those motions. That denial with 
respect to Salt Lake County was upon the basis that Plain-
tiffs at that time had established a prima facie case with 
respect to each Defendant. The judge then submitted the 
case to the jury upon special interrogatories. The findings 
of the jury relating to the creation of a dangerous or de-
fective condition and the negligence of the County were in 
response to the only questions posed by the Court. 
To refuse to enter judgment in accord with those 
findings constitutes error which should be reversed. 
B. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE JURY'S FIND-
INGS CONCERNING GIBBONS & REED'S NEGLI-
GENCE. 
Findings J(l) and K stated that Gibbons & Reed 
Company was negligent in "failing to take reasonable pre-
cautions to protect the project during construction" and 
that "such negligence proximately caused damage to 
Plaintiffs." (R. 728) A review of pertinent evidence 
shows that there was ample support for these findings. 
1. Gibbons & Reed Was Aware of the Flooding 
Potential. 
Like Salt Lake County, Gibbons & Reed was fully 
aware of the flooding hazard which existed in the subject 
area. Four Gibbons & Reed representatives were present 
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at the preconstruction conference where fkftling, cloud-
burst, and runoff hazardsvere discussed. (Ex. 7P) In addi-
tion, Gibbons & Reed also was a recipient of correspond-
ence from the Plaintiffs Kunkel. (See Ex. 54P) Mrs. 
Kunkel states in one of her letters that she orally advised 
Mr. Noel Gold of Gibbons & Reed of the flooding prob-
lem. (Ex. 54P) 
Gibbons & Reed, being a large general contractor 
in the Utah area, should have been aware of the likeli-
hood of cloudburst floods in August along the Wasatch 
Front. Gibbons & Reed was a defendant in the Sanford 
case, and, therefore, had direct knowledge of the potential 
for flood damage. * 
Exhibit 12 IP, appearing in a newspaper of general 
circulation in the Salt Lake City area, also served to pro-
vide added notice to Gibbons & Reed of the potential 
flooding hazard in the subject area. 
2. Despite Knowledge of the Hazard, Gibbons & 
Reed Took No Precautions To Protect the Project 
During Construction. 
As of August 17, 1969, the project was nearing com-
pletion. The denuded cut banks and unlined barrow pits 
created an added danger to the exposed storm sewer sys-
tem which had been connected. 
Gibbons & Reed had removed the protective barrier 
dike or curbing along Wasatch Boulevard and had elected 
*The Sanford Flood occurred on July 17, 1967. 488 P.2d 742. 
31 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not to replace it until a more advanced stage of the con-
struction process. (R. 1762) This decision was discretionary 
with Gibbons & Reed. (R. 1786) Similarly, Gibbons & 
Reed had not placed any of the concrete ditch liners. (R. 
1786) Finaly, no effort was made to temporarily prevent 
cut bank erosion pending the planting of grass or sod, 
or to protect lateral drain openings from eroded debris, 
even though such erosion could be expected. (R. 1521) 
Despite Gibbons & Reed's knowledge of the po-
tential hazard, the company simply claimed that there was 
"no reason" to take any temporary measures whatever to 
protect the project. (R. I860) This calculated risk 
obviously backfired, resulting in contributing to a large 
part of the damage in this case. Gibbons & Reed gambled 
that it would not rain during this critical construction 
phase. They lost that gamble and now Gibbons & Reed, 
not the Plaintiffs, should be made to pay for the losses. 
3. Temporary Protective Measures Would Have 
Been Reasonable to Prevent Injury to Plaintiffs. 
The specifications for the project require that Gib-
bons & Reed protect the project during construction and 
provide for proper drainage of the project. (R. I860) Ex-
pert witness Professor Jacobsen testified that it would not 
be good practice to leave lead drains which feed into a 
closed drain line unprotected by grates particularly during 
the period of construction. (R. 1849) Professor Jacobsen 
further stated that clogfree drain covers could have been 
used as a temporary device to protect the lateral storm 
drain intakes during the construction period. (R. 1850-
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51; see also 1202) Also, he stated that one project with 
which he was familiar, "ditch riders" had been employed 
to ensure that drain intakes remained unobstructed dur-
ing storms. (R. 1853) 
Gibbons & Reed saw "no need" to protect the project 
during this highly vulnerable construction phase in the 
most highly vulnerable storm month in one of the most 
highly vulnerable areas of the state. Given all the facts, 
the jury obviously disagreed with Gibbons & Reed and 
found that the company had negligently failed to protect 
the project and that this proximately contributed to the 
damage of Plaintiffs. (R. 728) 
The trial judge therefore acted in error by refusing 
to enter judgment against Gibbons & Reed in favor of 
the Plaintiffs. That error should be corrected by this 
Court through an order directing the Trial Court to modify 
his judgment to hold Gibbons & Reed liable with the State 
and County. 
4. The Trial Judge Denied Gibbons & Reed's 
Motions For A Directed Verdict. 
Following the close of Plaintiffs' case (and also at 
the close of all evidence), counsel for Gibbons & Reed 
moved for a Directed Verdict. The Court denied that 
motion, stating, (at R. 1461) 
I deny the motion at this time. I am going to 
submit this to the Jury on Interrogatories. 
It is thus clear that the Trial Court believed that Plain-
tiff had presented a prima facie case at that point of the 
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trial. The jury then answered one of the interrogatories 
propounded to it that Gibbons & Reed had acted negli-
gently and that the Plaintiffs were damaged thereby. 
It should be noted that the jury found that Gibbons 
& Reed was not negligent in following the State's plans. 
The Record was clear that the State supervised much of 
the construction. For this, Gibbons & Reed was not held 
accountable. However, in the critical area where Gibbons 
& Reed was permitted to exercise its own discretion (pro-
tecting the project during construction), the jury found 
that Gibbons & Reed was negligent and that the Plain-
tiffs were damaged thereby. Thus, the jury's verdict is 
internally consistent with the Record. 
Because the Record supports the jury's findings, Gib-
bons & Reed should have been held liable under the trial 
court's judgment. 
POINT III. 
THE STATE AND COUNTY SHOULD BE 
HELD LIABLE IN THIS CASE UNDER THE 
DOCTRINE OF "INVERSE CONDEMNA-
TION" 
A. ONE OF PLAINTIFFS' CAUSES OF ACTION 
AGAINST THE STATE AND COUNTY WAS 
ERRONEOUSLY DISMISSED PRIOR TO TRIAL. 
The Fourth Cause of Action set out in Plaintiffs' 
Complaint (see R. 4) claimed compensation for property 
which was "taken or damaged for public use" under 
Article I, Section 22, of the Utah Constitution. That cause 
of action was dismissed before trial. (R. 27) 
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Plaintiffs then appealed that ruling and this Court 
dismissed the appeals as premature, reserving to Plain-
tiffs the right to raise the issue at this time. (R. 47) 
Because of the importance of this issue with respect to 
the ability of Plaintiffs to obtain complete recovery for the 
proven wrongful acts of the State, Plaintiffs raise this 
issue again and urge this Court to give particular atten-
tion to the consideration of this matter. 
B. THE DOCTRINE OF INVERSE CONDEMNATION 
OFFERS NEEDED PROTECTION TO THE CITI-
ZENS IN THIS CASE. 
In essence, the doctrine of "inverse condemnation," 
if applied in Utah, would hold the State liable for 
damages suffered by the Plaintiffs on the basis of the 
Utah Constitution (Article I, Section 6), which requires 
the State to compensate a property owner for private prop-
erty taken or damaged for public use. Cases from other 
jurisdictions have applied the doctrine even in situations 
where no negligence was found.* 
In the present case, however, the jury found that the 
improvements constructed here were unreasonably defec-
tive or dangerous (Finding Dl , R. 727), and that County 
was negligent in providing reasonably adequate drain-
age facilities for the project (Finding I, R. 728). Thus, it 
is not necessary to rely upon absolute liability to apply 
inverse condemnation in the present case. There exists 
* See, e.g., Albert v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129 
(1965). 
35 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
an adequate basis for establishing the rule based upon 
traditional fault concepts. 
Without the application of the doctrine of inverse con-
demnation in this case, the sources from which the Plain-
tiffs could satisfy their judgment could be severely limited, 
resulting in the payment of only a small fraction of their 
actual out-of-pocket losses. It is, therefore, essential that 
this Court apply this doctrine against the State to insure 
that justice is accomplished in this proceeding. 
C. UTAH SHOULD ACCEPT THE DOCTRINE OF 
INVERSE CONDEMNATION ON A LIMITED 
BASIS WHERE FAULT IS ESTABLISHED. 
Plaintiffs are mindful that heretofore this Court has 
not applied the doctrine of inverse condemnation.* Never-
theless, on the basis of the reasons set out below, Plaintiffs 
respectfully urge that this Court should reconsider its 
previously expressed views and apply the doctrine in this 
case where fault has been established. 
* Utah is in the minority of States which have not yet adopted the doc-
trine of inverse condemnation. The majority of States with similar 
constitutional language have accepted the doctrine. The trend is 
clearly in this direction. See, e.g., State v. Leeson, 84 Ariz. 44, 323 
P.2d 692 (1958); Pima County v. Bilby, 87 Ariz. 366, 351 P.2d 647 
(1960); Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942); Bellman v. 
Contra Costa County, 54 Cal. 2d 363, 353 P.2d 300 (I960); City of 
Atlanta v. Donald, 11 Ga. App. 339, 141 S.E. 2d 560 (1965); Raymond 
v. State Dept. of Highways, 255 La. 425, 231 So. 2d 375, (1970), 
Garver v. Public Serv. Co. of NM.,t 77 N.M. 262 421 P.2d 788 (1966); Jamestown Plumbing & Heating Co. v. City of Jamestown, 
164 N.W. 2d 355 (N.D. 1969); Leslie County v. Davidson, 270 Ky. 
705, 110 S.W. 2d 652 (1937); Keck v. Hafley, 237 S.W. 2d 527 (Ky. 
1951); Wilson v. State Rd. Dept., 201 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1967); Okla-
homa City v. Wells, 184 Okl. 369, 91 P.2d 1077 (1939); Incorporated 
Town of Pittsburg v. Cochrane, 200 Okl. 497, 197 P.2d 287 (1948); 
Konrad v. State, 4 Wis. 2d 532, 91 N.W. 2d 203 (1958); Bare v. 
Department of Highways, 401 P.2d 552 (Idaho 1965); Heyert v. 
Orange and Rockland Utils. Inc., 262 N.Y.S. 2d 123 (1965), N.Y. 
Constitution Art. 1, §7; Herro v. Wisconsin Fed. Surplus Property 
Develop. Corp., 42 Wis. 2d 87, 166 N.W. 2d 433 (1969). 
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1. Utah Statutory Law Recognizes State Liability 
In Cases Where Fault Exists. 
The concept of sovereign immunity in Utah has been 
expressly abrogated by statute (63-30-1, et. seq.). Clearly, 
therefore, the State does not claim freedom from liability 
where facts meet the terms of the statute. 
In this case, where fault has been found by a jury 
and upheld by the Trial Court Judge, the Constitution 
should be interpreted to protect the citizens who have 
had their property taken or damaged. To do otherwise, 
would result in a taking of private property without ade-
quate compensation. This violates the Utah and Federal 
Constitutions. 
2. Highways Are Constructed Even Though Un-
foreseen Damage To Property Owners Is Possi-
ble. 
The public need for good highways dictates that these 
improvements will be constructed even though it is possible 
that property owners will be damaged in the process of 
construction. Thus, the State chooses to move forward 
with these projects knowing that definite risks exist. In 
the present case, the State proceeded with a project which 
the jury found was "unreasonably defective or dangerous." 
(Finding A, R. 721) 
Under these circumstances where the State knew or 
should have known that the project would cause damage 
to the Plaintiffs, it may be fairly said that the State intend-
ed the damage which the Plaintiffs suffered. Where the 
State directly and intentionally damages others property, 
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damages should be awarded without the arbitrary limit 
imposed in this case through the statute. This arbitrary 
limit on liability is repugnant to basic due process con-
cepts. 
For this reason alone, this Court should apply the 
doctrine of inverse condemnation here and thereby sanc-
tion liability of the State on a Constitutional, rather than 
statutory, basis. 
3. The Damage Here Occurred as a Part of the 
Work As Deliberately Planned and Carried Out. 
The jury found that there was no intervening force 
or Act of God in this case. (Finding G, R. 728) This is not 
a situation where a reservoir crumbled in an earthquake 
or where some other natural hollocost occurred. No argu-
ment is made here that liability should be imposed 
in such cases. 
But here, the damage ocurred because of the delib-
erately planned and executed project of the State with 
the assisting negligence of both Salt Lake County and 
Gibbons & Reed Company. Under these circumstances, 
application of the doctrine of inverse condemnation is 
appropriate and just. 
4. The Cost of the Damage In This Case Can Bet-
ter Be Absorbed by the Taxpayers as a Whole, 
The question of who can better bear the burden of this 
loss is easy to answer. The Plaintiffs were damaged in 
such a way that each separate family was forced to pay 
an average of many thousands of dollars per household. 
The sources of satisfying the trial court's judgment to 
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compensate for the Plaintiffs' losses are limited without 
the application of the doctrine of inverse condemnation 
(or the finding that Gibbons & Reed is liable). 
The damages suffered by the Plaintiffs in this case 
should properly be regarded as an additional cost of the 
highway project. When viewed in this light, the damages 
to Plaintiffs would increase the total cost of the project 
by only a small percentage of the overall project cost. 
Certainly, that cost should be absorbed by the entire 
tax base rather than just a few homeowners, who through 
no fault of their own, were subjected to the inadequacies 
of the State, County and Contractor. 
5. / / Not Fully Compensated, the Plaintiffs Would 
Be Forced to Contribute More Than Their Pro-
per Share to the Public Undertaking. 
Plaintiffs are taxpayers and do not object to contri-
buting their fair share to the cost of the public highway in 
question. 
Without adequate compensation, however, each 
Plaintiff will be forced by the State to contribute many 
times the amount contributed by other citizens to this 
same project. 
Obviously, this would yield a highly inequitable and 
unfair result. The Supreme Court of this State should not 
conclude that such a result was intended by the framers 
of the constitution nor the drafters of our statutes. 
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CONCLUSION 
The natural drainage courses were deliberately but 
negligently changed to direct the flood waters where they 
would not have otherwise gone. The homes and property 
of faultless victims were severely damaged as a result of 
what the jury determined to be the creation of an unrea-
sonably dangerous and defective improvement. The State 
and County collaborated in the assumption of a calculated 
risk. But for the heavy rain, their action would have been 
considered as economically profitable. Having lost their 
gamble, surely neither justice nor the public good require 
the sufferer to absorb the loss for either governmental 
unit. The jury found both County and State to be negli-
gent. The Contractor was also found by the judges of the 
facts to be negligent in failing to protect the project during 
construction resulting in damage to the Plaintiffs. The 
jury's findings being fully supported by the facts, the 
trial court exceeded its authority in extricating the County 
and Gibbons & Reed from the penalty of their negligence. 
This Court should reverse the decision of the Trial 
Court Judge and modify the Judgment to conform with 
the jury's findings. 
DATED: December 21, 1974 
Respectfully submited, 
BOYDEN & KENNEDY 
J O H N S. BOYDEN 
J O H N PAUL KENNEDY 
GEORGE J. ROMNEY 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
1000 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-0800 
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